Survivability

Overview

A system with a balanced survivability and susceptibility approach ensures operational crew and personnel safety while satisfying mission effectiveness and operational readiness requirements.

Survivability is the capability of a system (i.e., system survivability) and its crew (i.e., personnel survivability) to avoid or withstand a hostile environment without suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission (see Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Manual, Enclosure B, Appendix G, Annex C, System Survivability KPP Guide).

PMs and Systems Engineers should consider all aspects of survivability including reducing a system’s likelihood of being engaged by hostile fire, through attributes such as speed, maneuverability, detectability and countermeasures as well as reducing the vulnerability of the system and its occupants if hit by hostile fire by placement of armor around crew and critical components and ensuring redundancy of those critical components. In addition to survivability considerations from traditional kinetic fires, the PM, Systems Engineer, and Lead Software Engineer may need to consider the system and crew’s ability to survive and operate in:

Manmade and natural environmental conditions described in MIL-STD-810 (Environmental Engineering Considerations and Laboratory Tests) (e.g., sand, vibration, shock, immersion, fog, etc.),
Electromagnetic environments described in MIL-STD-461 (Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment) and MIL-STD-464 (Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems),
Chemical, biological, and radiological environments described in MIL-STD-3056 (Design Criteria for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological System Contamination Survivability),
Nuclear effects environments (including high-altitude electromagnetic pulse) described in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Nuclear Survivability Program Guidebook (DTRA-TR-14-71), and
Cyber environments described in DoDI 8500.01 Cybersecurity, JCIDS Cyber Survivability Endorsement Implementation Guide.

PMs, Systems Engineers, and Lead Software Engineers should consider cyber-survivability because of the reliance on networked information in today’s battlefield.

Additional considerations include designing for damage tolerance and rapid system reconstruction (reparability) to maximize wartime availability and sortie rates. The PM, Systems Engineer, and Lead Software Engineer should consider all of these aspects of system and crew survivability and, if necessary, perform trades to balance survivability, performance, cost, and risk. The PM should document the formal risk acceptance process used.

Unless waived by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), mission-critical systems, including crew, regardless of acquisition category, should be survivable to the threat levels anticipated in their projected operating environment as portrayed in their platform-specific Validated On-line Life-cycle Threat (VOLT) Report (see Adaptive Acquisition Framework Document Identification (AAFDID) tool) and Intelligence Guidebook.

The System Survivability KPP is intended to ensure the system, rather than the system occupants or other personnel, maintains its mission capabilities as defined in the CONOPS (see JCIDS Manual Enclosure B, Appendix G, Annex C). System Survivability should be assessed from three objective criteria: Susceptibility, Vulnerability, and Recoverability.

Susceptibility is the degree to which a device, piece of equipment, or system is open to effective attack as a result of one or more inherent weaknesses. Susceptibility is a function of operational tactics, countermeasures, probability of an enemy threat, etc.

Vulnerability refers to the characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation (loss or reduction of capability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain (defined) level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) or natural (e.g., lightning, solar storms) hostile environment.

Recoverability refers to the characteristics of a system’s resiliency to support the function necessary for mission success in spite of hostile action or under adverse conditions.

The Force Protection KPP is intended to ensure protection of occupants, users, or other personnel who may be adversely affected by the system or threats to the system (see JCIDS Manual Enclosure B, Appendix G, Annex B, Force Protection KPP Guide). Although the Force Protection KPP may include many of the same attributes as those that contribute to System Survivability, the intent of the Force Protection KPP is to emphasize protecting system occupants or other personnel rather than protecting the system itself. Protection requirements for Force Protection are generally higher than those in System Survivability.

Proper design and testing ensure that the system and crew can withstand manmade hostile environments without the crew suffering acute chronic illness, disability, or death. The PM, supported by the Systems Engineer, should fully assess system and crew survivability against anticipated threats throughout the system life cycle. The goal of survivability is to:

Provide mission assurance while maximizing warfighter safety (or minimizing their exposure to threats).
Incorporate balanced survivability, with consideration to the use of signature reduction with countermeasures.
Incorporate susceptibility reduction features that prevent or reduce engagement of threat weapons.
Provide mission planning and dynamic situational awareness features.

If the system or program has been designated by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), for live-fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) oversight, the PM should integrate test and evaluation (T&E) to address crew survivability issues into the LFT&E program supporting the Secretary of Defense LFT&E Report to Congress.

If the system or program has been designated a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) mission-critical system, the PM should address CBRN survivability, in accordance with DoDI 3150.09, CBRN Survivability Policy. The PM should ensure that progress toward CBRN survivability requirements is documented in the applicable Service CBRN mission-critical report. For all systems that may operate in a CBRN environment, the Systems Engineer should describe in the SEP how the system design incorporates the CBRN survivability requirements and how progress toward these requirements is tracked and documented over the acquisition life cycle.

System Survivability Key Performance Parameter

The mandatory System Survivability Key Performance Parameter (KPP) is applicable to all Capability Development Documents (CDD) and Capability Production Documents (CPD). The System Survivability KPP may include:

Reducing a system’s likelihood of being engaged by hostile fire, through attributes such as speed, maneuverability, detectability and countermeasures.
Reducing the system’s vulnerability if hit by hostile fire, through attributes such as armor and redundancy of critical components.
Enabling operation in degraded electromagnetic (EM), space or cyber environments.
Allowing the system to survive and continue to operate in, or after exposure to, a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) environment, if required.

If the system or program has been designated a CBRN mission-critical system, the PM should address CBRN survivability, in accordance with DoDI 3150.09, The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability Policy. The PM should ensure that progress toward CBRN survivability requirements is documented in the applicable Service CBRN mission-critical report. More information on CBRN can be found on the CBRN Survivability DoDTechipedia page [CAC-enabled].

Unless waived by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), mission-critical systems, including crew, regardless of acquisition category, should be survivable to the threat levels anticipated in their projected operating environment as portrayed in their platform-specific Validated On-line Life-cycle Threat (VOLT) Report (see Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 5000.002, Section 3.2 VOLT Reports for ACAT ID and IAM Programs).

Products and Tasks

Product	Tasks
10-23-1: Develop system survivability analysis	Obtain system threat assessment report (STAR), as well as static and environmental profiles from the intelligence cell and the platform cell of the platform system’s command. Obtain Concept of Operations/Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (CONOPS/OMS/MP) from the operational sponsor. Evaluate the static and environmental profiles to determine the survivability of the design within proposed / historical or projected operational / threat environment in accordance with current guidance. Develop a mathematical model of the system’s survivability relative to specific threats and design trade options. Perform a cost benefit analysis with different design options to determine the optimal design relative to the threat environment and other requirements and constraints of the design. Develop recommendations for the system’s requirements based on the cost benefit analysis. Document safety and other technical and programmatic risks based on the recommended requirements. Incorporate evaluation of profiles, models of system survivability, analysis and recommendations into the system survivability analysis and provide to decision maker.
10-23-2: Develop electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) analysis	Identify the projected environments for the proposed design consistent with the concept of operations / operational mode summary / mission profile (CONOPS/OMS/MP). Obtain system design technical data package, as well as mission capability metrics, for the proposed design. Determine the survivability and susceptibility of the proposed / historical design against E3 effects in the projected operational / threat environment in accordance with current guidance. Develop a mathematical model of the system’s survivability and susceptibility relative to design trade options. Perform a cost benefit analysis with different design options to determine the optimal design relative to the threat environment and other requirements and restraints of the design. Develop recommendations for the system requirements based on the cost benefit analysis. Document safety and other technical and programmatic risks based on the recommended requirements. Incorporate evaluation of environments, models of system survivability, analysis and recommendations into the electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) analysis and provide to decision maker.
10-23-3: Develop survivability and susceptibility requirements and testing requirements submitted for inclusion in the system specification and testing plan	Obtain the results of electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) environment modeling and simulation analysis. Based on the analysis of the system’s survivability and susceptibility (including the M&S analysis), the system’s concept of operations, and capability development document (CDD), develop specific survivability and susceptibility requirements for inclusion into the system specification. Based on the developed requirements, and the proposed system design, determine the most practical means of verifying the system’s requirements for survivability and susceptibility. Document survivability and susceptibility requirements, as well as test requirements, and submit to decision maker for inclusion in the system specification and the program’s test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) in accordance with current guidance.

Source: AWQI eWorkbook

Resources

Key Terms

Source:
DAU ACQuipedia
DAU Glossary

Policy and Guidance

DoDI 3150.09, The CBRN Survivability Policy
DoDI 8500.01, Cybersecurity
MIL-STD-461, Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment
MIL-STD-464, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems
MIL-STD-810, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems
MIL-STD-464, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems
Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Manual (CAC Required), Enclosure B, Appendix G, Annex C, System Survivability KPP Guide; and Enclosure B, Appendix G, Annex B, Force Protection KPP Guide
JCIDS Cyber Survivability Endorsement Implementation Guide
Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Nuclear Survivability Program Guidebook (DTRA-TR-14-71)
Systems Engineering (SE) Guidebook 5.22 Survivability
DoDI 5000.86 Acquisition Intelligence
Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 5000.002
Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapon Systems (CROWS) Cyber Resiliency Support Team (CRST) Toolkit
Intelligence Support Guidebook
OUSD(A&amnp;A) Acquisition Intelligence Division webpage

DAU Training Courses

ETM 1050: Design Considerations Fundamentals Lesson 23 Survivability
CLE 079: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability