2.5.1.8. Section 8: Spectrum and E3 Control Requirements. No change from a regular CDD to the Spectrum Requirements section of the IS-CDD.

For reference or comparison, below is what the JCIDS Manual says for the CDD 2021 itself:

2.5.8.3. All electrical and electromagnetic systems, subsystems, and equipment, including ordnance, must comply with E3 direction IAW [47]. Summarize in this section the requirements to ensure mutual electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and effective E3 control in its electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). Requirements to control E3 shall consider all applicable E3 disciplines including EMC, electromagnetic vulnerability (EMV), electromagnetic pulse (EMP), electromagnetic protection (EP), electrostatic discharge (ESD), including personnel-borne and helicopter-borne ESD IAW JOTP-062, and hazards of electromagnetic radiation to personnel (HERP), ordnance (HERO) IAW JOTP-061, and fuel (HERF).

2.5.8.3.1. The congested EMOE includes EM emissions from not only DoD mission-essential systems, but also contributions from non-military spectrum dependent systems including those operated by other federal agencies, U.S. civilians, commercial entities, our military allies, and foreign nations where deployed. The EMOE must therefore consider all potential background friendly and neutral EMI where the area of influence encroaches the intended operational area. Coordination is typically required to properly prioritize, schedule, and deconflict within the known EMOE. Joint and combined operations often increase the potential for safety and reliability issues since a system is likely to be exposed to a more diverse and congested EMOE than what was initially anticipated and designed to support.

2.5.8.3.2. Joint forces must also have unimpeded access to and use of the contested EMOE to create vulnerabilities and opportunities for EW actions in support of military operations. Such actions may involve the use of EM energy or directed energy (DE) to control the EMS or to attack the enemy for the purpose of denying the opponent an advantage in the EMS, ensuring unimpeded access to and use of the EMS, and supporting operations across all domains. To ensure survivability, U.S. military platforms, systems, subsystems, and equipment must be designed to preclude the effects of electromagnetic attack (EA) from hostile EW systems and equipment IAW Reference [69]. Ultimately, one of the fundamental objectives of the DoD is to provide systems whose performance will not be affected adversely by the EMOE during all phases of their operation and life cycle.