2.5.2. Section 2: Threat Summary. (Reference the Intelligence Supportability Guide described in Annex G to Appendix G of this enclosure)

2.5.2.1. The purpose of this section is to ensure that capability and the associated capability gaps are based on consistent threat environment information and references. Sponsors must provide traceability to the most current DIE threat products used to support their SW-ICD.

2.5.2.2. Cite the threat products from the DIE used during the development of the capability identified in the SW-ICD.

2.5.2.3. Identify all anticipated capabilities that adversaries might employ against the capability being reviewed and provide sufficient information and analysis from the supporting DIE element. This information and analysis should address capability and associated capability gaps related to the conduct of operational tasks and missions, rather than only defining threats to a future capability solution and their associated

performance parameters.

2.5.2.4. Provide a description of all threat capabilities, threat tactics, and adversary doctrine, if available, in the expected operational environment and the nature of current and anticipated threats which are a factor in setting the capability and initial objective values.

2.5.2.4.1. Ensure judgments or extrapolations regarding adversarial capabilities are appropriate, logical, complete, and consistent with threat products from the DIE.

2.5.2.4.2. Consider threats to follow-on research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E), production, and operation and maintenance (O&M) resulting from technology transfer, espionage, and other adversarial collection efforts.

2.5.2.4.3. Consider threats that are likely to evolve or change to ensure flexibility in requirements.

2.5.2.4.4. Threats are factors that an adversary can control and direct, or will be able to direct, and do not include environmental or natural factors such as weather or terrain, mechanical component failure, or program issues related to budgeting, restructuring or cancellation.

2.5.2.5. Cite any related CIPs, either as approved CIPs or as proposed new CIPs for review and approval in conjunction with SW-ICD validation.

2.5.2.5.1. CIPs will be included for capabilities in development that are determined to be threat-sensitive. For a SW-ICD, CIPs should be tied to the threat assumptions behind the gap analysis.

2.5.2.5.2. Sponsors should consult with DIA/TLA and the supporting Service- level intelligence element during the development of the requirement to determine if a capability is threat-sensitive.

2.5.2.5.3. CIPs (IAW Reference [37]) are defined as a threat capability or threshold established collaboratively by the requirements sponsor and the capability developer, changes to which could critically impact the effectiveness and survivability of the proposed system.