2.5.4. Section 3: Capability Requirements (CR) and Gaps/Overlaps.

2.5.4.1. The purpose of this Section is to specify CRs and to assess associated capability gaps in terms of a comparison between the CR and current capability solutions available to the Joint Force or in development.

2.5.4.2. In separate paragraphs, define CRs in the following manner: "The ability to [perform a task (UJT or Service Task) Operational Activity] against/given a [Threat] in order to achieve [Effect] in a/under [Environmental Conditions] in the [Standard Timeframe]." CRs must be general enough so as not to create the appearance of a predetermined capability solution or solution approach (e.g., new system, FoS, SoS) but specific enough to evaluate alternative means to achieve the capability.

2.5.4.2.1. Operational Activity. This is what the capability must do or perform to satisfy one or more tasks. Although not limited to, the operational activities should be described in the lexicon of the UJTs or DoD Component equivalents.

2.5.4.2.2. Threat. Detailed threat analysis is critical for friendly force mission planning and defense suppression across all domains. The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) alerts decision-makers at all echelons to potential emerging situations and threats. The threat that a capability is designed to neutralize or defeat to successfully complete a specified mission must be clearly identified. The threat should be consistent with the JIPOE conducted for the joint commander.

2.5.4.2.3. Effect. The operational effect or end state that is required for the capability to achieve that will enable the successful completion of the mission in support of the NMS.

2.5.4.2.4. Physical Areas and Factors: The environmental and other non-threat related conditions in which the capability must operate are also identified. These conditions should be consistent with those found in the JIPOE.

2.5.4.2.5. Timeframe. The expected timeframe the capability needs to be available for, must be consistent with the IOC and FOC timelines in the ICD.

2.5.4.2.6. Example. "The ability to collect operational information given an advanced Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) threat environment in order to maintain situational awareness of enemy movements in an urban environment in the 2030 timeframe."

2.5.4.3. For each CR, specify the required operational attributes with appropriate quantitative parameters and metrics, e.g., outcomes, time, distance, effect (including scale), obstacles to be overcome, supportability, etc. See Annex A to Appendix B of Enclosure C to the manual for examples of operational attributes.

2.5.4.3.1. Indicate the initial objective value for each operational attribute to provide a discrete value that satisfies the operational need(s) for the capability. This will serve as the starting point for analysis supporting CR trade-offs above and below the initial objective value. In the narrative portion of the requirement, describe the operational implications that drive the value to be proposed at the specified level. Consider the effects of cybersecurity and any required additional support needed from the IC in determining the initial objective values, as described in paragraphs 2.5.4.3.1.1 and 2.5.4.3.1.2 below.

2.5.4.3.1.1. Initial objective values are the values necessary to achieve mission objectives with moderate operational risk. The narrative should explain why the CRs are essential to the Sponsor in order to achieve assigned goals and objectives. Include assessment of operational implications - increased or decreased operational risks - which may be a factor as CRs are traded up or down during follow-on analysis and development efforts.

2.5.4.3.1.2. Values listed as To Be Determined (TBD), those specified only as a ratio relative to the value of a legacy capability solution, or operational attributes without quantifiable measures, are not allowed. In such cases, the Sponsor is not ready to document CRs in an ICD and must perform additional analysis based on the applicable Service and Joint Concepts or CONOPS before finalizing the ICD.

2.5.4.3.2. The narrative, attributes, and values in the CR and capability gap Section must be consistent with DoDAF CVs generated during prior analysis, as modified for the scope and purpose of the ICD, including the DoDAF CV-2, CV-3, and CV-6.

2.5.4.4. Intelligence supportability to the CR. If known, Sponsors should include in the narrative portion of the requirement a description of the intelligence support requirements and resources needed to enable each CR. This description will be provided by identifying the intelligence support categories applicable to each CR and identifying the support requirements and resources within each category. Sponsors should refer to Annex G of Appendix G to this Enclosure for a definition of the intelligence support categories.

2.5.4.5. Survivability Considerations.

2.5.4.5.1. Cyber Survivability Considerations (cybersecurity and cyber operational resilience). CRs should also consider the cybersecurity threat when determining initial objective values and include the appropriate CSRC. An exemplar statement can be provided in an (optional) Appendix E to the ICD. Refer to Annex C to Appendix G of this enclosure and the Cyber Survivability Endorsement Implementation Guide which can be found on KM/DS IAW Reference [4] for more details. In addition, the ICD should identify the system categorization for information systems and Platform IT (PIT) systems as a required capability - the potential impact (low, moderate, or high) resulting from loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability if a security breach occurs. This is required by DoD’s Risk Management Framework for Information Technology Systems (Reference [10]).

2.5.4.5.2. Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) Survivability Considerations. CRs should also consider EMS threats when determining initial objective values and include exemplar statement in the ICD for the appropriate EMS Survivability Risk Category. An exemplar statement can be provided in an (optional) Appendix F to the ICD. Refer to Annex C to Appendix G of this enclosure and the DoD Guidebook for Electromagnetic Spectrum Survivability which can be found on KM/DS IAW Reference [4] for EMS Survivability requirements.

2.5.4.5.3. CBRN Survivability Considerations. The sponsor shall clearly state whether the proposed solution will be required to operate in CBRN (including EMP) environments and ensure required CBRN operations are addressed in any follow-on AoA(s). The sponsor determines if the resulting system is “mission critical” or not. If “mission critical” and the system is vital to an essential defense mission that is required survive and/or operate in CBRN environments, the sponsor will designate the system “CBRN Mission Critical” per Reference DoDI 3150.09, Reference [77]. Additionally, the sponsor must include rationale justifying when a “Mission Critical” system is not designated “CBRN Mission-Critical.” CBRN Mission Critical systems must consider all relevant CBRN environments (as indicated in the threat section).

2.5.4.6. In a new paragraph for each requirement, describe the capability gaps or overlaps in terms of the difference between the initial objective values and the performance levels of capability solutions currently available to the joint force or in development. Identify those CRs for which there exist overlaps or redundancies, including considerations of existing or planned capabilities in other DoD Components; U.S. Government agencies or departments; and allied or partner nations. Assess whether the overlap is advisable for operational redundancy or if the overlap is a potential tradeoff to satisfy other identified capability gaps.

2.5.4.6.1. When describing “current capabilities” in the narrative paragraphs, Sponsors must consider all PORs and rapidly fielded capability solutions in the joint force. This should be consistent with the market research conducted as part of the CBA described in Annex B to Appendix B to Enclosure C of this manual.

2.5.4.6.1.1. Sponsors may not exclude viable capability solutions from the comparison because they are not the Sponsor’s preferred solution, or because they are developed and operated by another DoD Component.

2.5.4.6.1.2. Sponsors must ensure review of identified capability gaps by someone with visibility into capability solutions protected by higher classification levels.

2.5.4.6.1.3. If identified capability gaps would be different in light of capability solutions protected by higher classification levels, Sponsors may provide supplemental data in the form of a classified appendix as described at the end of the ICD format guidance.

2.5.4.6.2. When describing a recapitalization (or “next generation”) situation, the “current capabilities” must consider the capability solution being replaced, as well as other viable solutions as noted above. Life extension or continuing/restarting production of the fielded capability solution, or possibly leveraging portions of fielded capability solutions, may be part of tradeoff discussions and/or follow-on AoA activities.

2.5.4.7. Clearly identify how each capability gap identified impacts the operational context in Section 1 of the ICD, in terms of inability to execute part or all of an operational plan and/or unacceptable levels of operational risk. Where workarounds are feasible until the requirements proposed in the ICD are satisfied by capability solutions, then identify the workarounds and operational risk(s) associated with them.

2.5.4.8. Summary Table. Provide a summary table for the relationship between CRs in each JCA (Tier 2) and relevant operational attributes and associated gaps/overlaps with respect to current or programmed force capabilities in a table as shown in Figure B-1. Sponsors should relate CRs to the lowest tier possible.

2.5.4.8.1. In cases where phased introduction of capabilities is appropriate to the Joint or Service concepts or CONOPS, different levels of CRs can be listed for different timeframes and must be consistent with the DoDAF CV-3.

2.5.4.8.2. This table will serve as a guide for development of follow-on JCIDS documents.

2.5.4.8.3. TBD values are not allowed for either the initial objective value or the current performance. The Joint Staff Gatekeeper will reject documents with TBD in these sections.