2.5.1.9. Section 9: Intelligence Supportability. No change from a regular CDD to the Intelligence Supportability section of the IS-CDD.

For reference or comparison, below is what the JCIDS Manual says for the CDD 2021 itself:

2.5.9. Section 9: Intelligence Supportability. Reference the Threat and Intelligence Supportability Guide in Annex G to Appendix G to this enclosure.

2.5.9.1. The purpose of this section is to identify intelligence support requirements and to ensure compliance with appropriate IC policy and guidance. This information also informs the intelligence review and certification conducted during staffing of the CDD.

2.5.9.2. Identify, as specifically as possible, all intelligence support requirements throughout the projected lifecycle, to include the requisite GEOINT projection source used for Navigation, Relative Positioning, Mission Planning, Visualization or Situational Awareness, IAW Annex G to Appendix G of this enclosure.

2.5.9.3. Programs will be reviewed by the Intel community, including DIA and J-283/IRCO, for IMD dependency. Intelligence certification will include DIA evaluation and approval of actionable IMD requirements derived from the Lifecycle Mission Data Plan (LMDP).

{From Annex G, Appendix G, Enclosure B}

3.3.2. Intelligence Supportability Section Content. Introduce the paragraph with a general description of the support category types and level of required support to fully enable the capability’s operational intent using the considerations above.

3.3.2.1. Intelligence Resources Support.

3.3.2.1.1. Intelligence Resources Support refers to any or all of the following subcategories: Intelligence Manpower; Intelligence Funding; and Intelligence Training. Sponsors shall address all applicable subcategories required to support the objectives of the requirements document.

3.3.2.1.2. Intelligence Manpower - Sponsor must address if the capability solution will require intelligence personnel for development, testing, training and/or operations. Sponsor must also address whether existing skills and specialties suffice, or address the anticipated required manpower to support the capability solution, expected required certifications, skill specialties (e.g., Air Force Specialty Code, Military Occupational Specialty), schools/courses, and language skills. Depending on the maturity of the capability solution, the Sponsor may have completed a Manpower Estimation Report (MER) and should include it as an enclosure to the requirements document. If a MER shows that intelligence manpower changes will be required from the current baseline to support the fielding of the capability solution, a summary of intelligence implications from that report is to be included in this support category.

3.3.2.1.3. Intelligence Funding - Sponsor must address if the capability solution or supporting efforts will require or depend upon Service, Military Intelligence Program, or other sources of intelligence funding to achieve requirements or performance attributes. Address any Sponsor-facilitated actions to secure funding if necessary approvals have not been received. Account for the resources required to augment intelligence support, in cases where requirements exceed the IC’s ability to support, in the Program Affordability section of the requirements document.

3.3.2.1.4. Intelligence Training - Some capability solutions may require intelligence personnel to provide specialized training to support part or all of a given capability solution’s lifecycle. Sponsors must address new requirements levied upon Service Intelligence or IC schools/courses to include language skill development or additional training quotas for personnel. In any case, the requirement for training must be identified, analyzed, and declared as soon as possible to permit sufficient lead-time to facilitate curriculum development and cultivate personnel with the required skills needed to support the capability solution.

3.3.2.2. Targeting Intelligence Support.

3.3.2.2.1. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. Intelligence supports targeting by relying on DIE-produced intelligence products; with support and coordination from the Intelligence Community (IC) and multinational intelligence organizations. Target development occurs in three stages: basic, intermediate, and advanced target development. Each stage of the target development process results in the continual refinement of the minimum intelligence data necessary to plan for effective target engagement.

3.3.2.2.2. Examples of intelligence data includes entity-level basic, intermediate, and advanced target development data; Target System Analysis; Electronic Target Folders; target lists; and target intelligence assessments. ATD is the part of the targeting cycle that focuses on weaponeering, aim point selection and Development, and Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE).

3.3.2.2.3. Sponsors must consider intelligence support to targeting if their capability solution will employ, or will rely on the employment of, offensive kinetic and/or non-kinetic capabilities. Target development shortfalls may negatively impact the capability solution’s successful development, integration with existing targeting or weaponeering databases, on-time delivery schedule, and ultimately its operational status (i.e., intelligence support to targeting is a broad category that encompasses munitions and all associated capability solutions relying upon the munition). The joint targeting cycle provides the foundation for intelligence support to targeting, whether the solution is kinetic or non-kinetic, to improve the likelihood of achieving desired military objective. Munitions Effectiveness Assessments (MEA) and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) studies may help identify gaps in FA capabilities for follow-on operations.

3.3.2.2.4. Sponsors shall use the Joint Planning process, or Service equivalent, to perform target development. This process may allow sponsors to anticipate the volume of targets, the target folders necessary, and the accompanying aim points to effect an operation. Sponsors are advised to follow certification and accreditation requirements in accordance with Reference [160].

3.3.2.2.5. Targeting support may overlap with the IMD GEOINT support category because many targeting services rely upon and/or incorporate geospatial products or information. Coordinate-seeking weapons, or weapons that can or will be able to operate in a coordinate-seeking mode, must declare required target location error -- expressed as circular and linear error in meters or feet -- with an associated confidence level reported at 90 percent.

3.3.2.2.5.1. GEOINT provides two irreplaceable components that contribute to all aspects of warfighting, including weapons and weapon systems: a framework (WGS84) that renders other intelligence actionable by virtue; and referencing it to a four dimensional space-time context and critical qualitative and quantitative information to describe the physical and functional characteristics of the political, economic, military, social, informational, and infrastructure components of an adversary’s capabilities. World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS 84), which incorporates an ellipsoidal Earth model, is the official DOD positional coordinate reference system. In unilateral and joint operations, the US military will use the WGS 84 geodetic 3-D coordinate reference system – (including Height Above Ellipsoid) unless the Commander determines that the use of other position reference systems (i.e. datum) is missional critical. Universal use of the WGS 84 provides the common, global, accurate reference system necessary for modern military operations and precision weapons. “Web Mercator” shall not be used. Many popular, commercial, visualization applications use systems that appear to be WGS 84 in name but, in fact, do not comply with the definition of WGS 84. Some examples are “Web Mercator”, “WGS 84 Web Mercator”, “WGS 1984 Web Mercator (Auxiliary Sphere)”, and “EPSG 3857.” The use of these systems and data from these systems may result in errors up to 40,000 meters.

3.3.2.2.5.2. The fusion of intelligence (including imagery-derived MASINT) with geospatial information to create GEOINT conveys understanding of enemy assets and actions that play a dominant role in determining weapon and weapon system effectiveness. Early and concise identification of GEOINT shortfalls for planning and execution to optimize weapon and weapon system effectiveness is a matter of critical concern when NGA must justify requirements for resources and apportionment of those resources within the agency. An example of such GEOINT shortfalls would be the identification of routine data exploitation and production requirements for the construction details of buildings that affect the performance of miniaturized munitions. Another example would be concise description of man-made features and demographic distributions in urban areas where planned operations must consider high-fidelity estimation of collateral damage risks.

3.3.2.3. Intelligence Interoperability Support.

3.3.2.3.1.The Intelligence Interoperability (I2) support category addresses a capability’s requirement to exchange (send or receive) intelligence with an organization outside of the Service developing the capability. Sponsors must document any external (IC, Service or Coalition Partner) intelligence requirements in Section 3 of an ICD or Section 9.4 of a CDD. Sponsors must define external intelligence interoperability requirements at the data, tool, process and organization levels. Data standards, activities and organizational relationships must be documented using DoDAF Standards View-1 (StdV-1), Operational View-4 (OV-4) and Operational View-5b (OV-5b) IAW Appendix H to enclosure B.

3.3.2.3.1.1.The I2 section must be consistent with the Operational Context, Capability Discussion, Performance Attributes, DOTmLPF-P, Joint Interoperability, of the requirements document and associated DoDAF artifacts.

3.3.2.3.1.2. Sponsors will document any external intelligence exchanges, to include data standards, activities and organizational relationships in accordance with Appendix H TO Enclosure B; “DoDAF PRIMER”. Any applicable intelligence interoperability exchanges must be documented in the StdV-1, OV-4 and OV-5b DoDAF views. Sponsors will also depict any related intelligence networks (i.e. JWICS) in applicable SV’s.

3.3.2.3.1.3. If no external intelligence interactions (input or output) is required by the capability developer, then the Sponsor must state there are no I2 dependencies.

3.3.2.3.2. Sponsors must collaborate with J-283/IRCO and the DoD Intelligence Functional Managers as required to assess Sponsor-submitted I2 information: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), NSA; Human Intelligence (HUMINT), DIA; Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), DIA; and Geospatial-Intelligence (GEOINT), NGA.

3.3.2.4. Space Intelligence Support

3.3.2.4.1. Space intelligence support refers to a capability solution's requirement to directly ingest space-based sensor data, such as imagery, signals, or measurements and signatures. It does not include a capability solution's mission requirements for finished intelligence products or operational requirements for space-based services, such as positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), communications relay, or weather.

3.3.2.4.2. The Sponsor should address requirements in terms of timeliness and means of delivery, anticipated throughput, interoperability of communication systems (including requirements for interoperability with coalition and other organizations’ systems), format of information delivered (including compliance with data and metadata standards), and information/product storage location, capacity and accessibility.

3.3.2.4.3. The Sponsor should provide an assessment, if possible, of the existing space-based infrastructure capacity to support the needs of the capability in development, or if the infrastructure may require augmentation. If the capability in development will rely upon future or planned space-based capabilities, or if the existing space-based capability requires augmentation, the Sponsor should consider impacts to the capability in development and provide mitigating strategies if the existing or planned space-based capability is insufficient.

3.3.2.4.4. Sponsors should describe the types of interactions depicted in applicable DoDAF products including the capability’s need to send and/or receive information through or from space-based platforms, types of products, and anticipated throughput volume, capacity, and frequency.

3.3.2.5. Intelligence Mission Data Support

3.3.2.5.1. Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) is DoD intelligence used for programming platform mission systems in development, testing, operations, and sustainment. IMD includes, but is not limited to, the functional areas of signatures, electromagnetic warfare integrated reprogramming (EWIR), order of battle (OOB), characteristics and performance (C&P), and GEOINT. Sponsors should engage local intelligence support to understand how to levy IMD into capability requirement development. Sponsors shall consider and address IMD requirements throughout the capability’s lifecycle to ensure availability to support needs in development and through sustainment. For descriptions of the IMD functional types and linkages to existing IMD repositories, see Reference [48] and SIPRNET: https://intellipedia.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Intelligence_Mission_Data_Center.

3.3.2.5.2. If the capability solution is IMD-dependent, Sponsors must address the following: list the relevant IMD functional area(s); whether requirements have been submitted in the appropriate IMD management system; an assessment of the IC’s ability to support the requirements; and the status of the program’s LMDP.

3.3.2.5.2.1. When a capability’s KPPs, KSAs, or other performance attributes depend upon another program, the Sponsor must also address the IMD requirements of the IMD-dependent subsystem(s) and LMDP(s).

3.3.2.5.2.2. In cases where different levels of IMD contribute to different levels of performance, Sponsors should use a risk assessment methodology to evaluate requirements, and assess the criticality of different IMD levels IAW CJCSI 3318.01 and potential shortfalls, against performance attributes and mission effectiveness. Sponsors should also be prepared to address any residual IMD shortfalls during FCB capability reviews, specifically the impact on the capability when IMD shortfalls exist. In such circumstances, the Sponsor should be prepared to describe mitigating strategies including change in CONOPS, change in system design, or a recommendation to offset shortfalls through increased resourcing when a decrement in the capability delivered is unacceptable.

3.3.2.6. Counterintelligence and Security Support

3.3.2.6.1. Consistent with references [102], [103], and [104], counterintelligence (CI) and security support are necessary to protect technology and CPTI against FIE, supply chain and similar threats throughout a system’s lifecycle. CI support includes the intelligence information, resources, and activities used to help establish plans, tools, or techniques to protect designated CPTI.

3.3.2.6.1.1. CPTI is U.S. capability elements that contribute to warfighters’ technical advantage, which would undermine U.S. technical preeminence if compromised. CPTI is identified through an analytic process conducted by the program office early in program development. The program office then requests a technology, program, and system threat assessment from appropriate intelligence, CI, and security organizations. These threat assessments describe the FIE, supply chain, and anti-tamper threats to a program, which are included in a JCIDS document Threat Summary, and are the foundation for a capability’s CI and Security Support requirements.

3.3.2.6.2. Security support addresses efforts to maintain a technological advantage and program protection for all DoD research, technology, and programs. Security support includes physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, and prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; communications security measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value, including the use of cryptographic material; and, measures to prevent the insertion of malicious capabilities, or exploitation of existing vulnerabilities, in hardware or software to disrupt or degrade system performance.

3.3.2.6.3. CI and Security Support may include any number of activities applied throughout a capability solution's lifecycle to protect CPTI, address supply chain risks, and support development of a Program Protection Plan (PPP). At a minimum, the following actions are required in order to fully identify CI and Security Support requirements and devise adequate protection measures to capability development. These actions should be consistent with the FIE and supply chain threats in Threat Summaries. Sponsors should engage associated Service CI personnel to coordinate collection, analytic, or production support requirements.

3.3.2.6.3.1. ICDs and IS-ICDs. If the Threat Summary includes FIE and/or supply chain threats, Sponsors should include the CI and Security Support category in the document’s Intelligence Supportability Requirements paragraph. Sponsors should also coordinate closely with the Program Office, MDCOs, and intelligence support offices to ensure necessary criticality analysis, CI assessments of the FIE threat, supply chain threat analysis, and technology targeting risk assessment production requirements are initiated and on track to support further capability development.

3.3.2.6.3.2. CDDs, IS-CDDs and CDD Updates (as applicable).

3.3.2.6.3.2.1. Sponsors shall address identification of capability-associated critical components and CPTI, the production status and currency of CI assessments of the FIE threat, supply chain threat analysis, and the development of any other associated CI activities supporting protection of CPTI. Sponsors may include correspondence or COLISEUM production requirements to document such supportability requests.

3.3.2.6.2.3.2.2. Sponsors shall identify the measures and countermeasures required to protect CPTI, to include the following:

3.3.2.6.3.2.2.1. Providing foreign collection threat information to personnel supporting concept, doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, policy, or other non-materiel capability development activities.

3.3.2.6.3.2.2.2. Participating in installation-level, program-level, or facility-level threat working groups to inform participants of foreign collections threats to concept, doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, policy, or other non-materiel capability development activities.

3.3.2.6.3.2.2.3. Coordinating with security managers, intelligence, and cybersecurity personnel to aid in cyber threat identification and the establishment of countermeasures designed to detect and mitigate foreign and international terrorist cyber-associated threats to concept, doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, policy, or other non-materiel capability development activities.

3.3.2.6.3.2.2.4. Reviewing Sponsor-affiliated capability development documents to assist in developing foreign collection threat awareness training and requesting CI analytical support.

3.3.2.6.3.2.2.5. Evaluating individual and organizational awareness of foreign collection threats to determine vulnerabilities of FIE collection, assessing the effectiveness of existing countermeasures, and assisting Sponsor’s security personnel develop new countermeasures.

3.3.2.6.3.2.3. Sponsors shall address security support requirements to enhance protection of the capability, including measures for physical security, personnel, Industrial, Classified and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) security, communication security, technology security, and requirements associated with the exportability or foreign-involvement with CPTI, including anti-tamper, supply chain and foreign disclosure.

3.3.2.6.3.3. Joint DCRs. Sponsors shall address CI and Security support requirements as stated in para 3.3.2.6, if the Joint DCR will increase quantities or alternate applications of existing materiel solutions, especially those solutions previously identified with CPTI, newly intended for release or disclosure to Allies, or will result in foreign-military sales.